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PROTECTED BUT PREJUDICED: REDEFINING
A CORPORATION’S ABILITY TO PURSUE OR
DEFEND LITIGATION WITHOUT COUNSEL
Nazgole Hashemi*
This Article touches on a major issue faced in litigation by corporations that are owned and operated by a single individual; specifically,
the well-established rule that a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney in litigation, subject to some exceptions. As a business
litigation attorney, the author represents corporations and businesses in
various types of disputes and has seen first-hand the prejudice that results to a small, single-owner corporation or limited liability company as
a result of the well-established rule. While there may be reasonable and
valid justifications for the rule for large or multi-owner companies, these
justifications do not carry the same weight in the context of single-person
entities. Therefore, this Article advocates for an additional exception to
the rule for a single-person corporation, so that the owner does not have
to choose between shielding corporate income and assets from liability
and being able to represent the business in a court of record.

* Nazgole Hashemi is an attorney in California and co-founder of LegalAxxis, Inc. She primarily practices general civil litigation and also serves as general counsel for businesses in various
industries. She is also an Associate Professor of Securities Regulation and Negotiation & Dispute
Resolution at Southwestern Law School. The author thanks Jacqueline Dilanchyan and William N.
Rafael for research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BAN ON CORPORATE SELF-REPRESENTATION
Jane Bennet is the sole shareholder, director, and officer of a forprofit corporation that is registered and incorporated in the State of
California. She established the entity to safeguard her personal income
and assets from corporate liabilities. Jane knows that she has the protection of the corporate shield, but she is about to learn that she has
also been prejudiced by it. A disgruntled third-party vendor claiming,
albeit without legitimate basis, breach of contract by the corporation
sues it to recover damages. The corporation’s financial circumstance
is grave, routinely underperforming in the last year or so following a
decline in its industry. After the corporation is served with the lawsuit,
its response is due within thirty days, but it does not have sufficient
capital to retain an attorney to file pleadings on its behalf or to defend
it in the litigation. However, without representation by a licensed attorney, the corporation cannot file a response to the lawsuit and indeed
the court will strike any pleadings filed by a non-attorney following
notice to the corporation of the ban on self-representation and an opportunity to retain counsel.1
Although the corporation is running in the best interest of Jane
and only Jane, as the sole shareholder,2 she is prohibited from representing the corporation in the litigation and from filing pleadings on
behalf of the corporation. This would be true even if the amount in
controversy were low enough to place the case in limited jurisdiction
court, meaning the amount in controversy does not exceed
$25,000.00.3 Jane has two options: spend her own personal funds to
hire an attorney to represent the corporation, an option that she cannot
afford and does not desire, or enable the plaintiff to initiate default
proceedings, an option that is unfair given the corporation’s good faith
and meritorious defense to the vendor’s claim. This result stems from
California’s well-established rule that a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney in litigation, subject to some exceptions,
none of which apply to this scenario.4

1. CLD Constr., Inc. v. City of San Ramon, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 561 (Ct. App. 2004); Gamet
v. Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 444 n.5 (Ct. App. 2001).
2. “[C]orporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders and . . .
must serve ‘in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.’” Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 890
(Ct. App. 2009) (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 2014)).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 85(a) (2022).
4. Merco Constr. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Mun. Ct., 581 P.2d 636, 638–40 (Cal. 1978).
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Section 28043 of the California Corporations Code defines the
term “person” as “any natural person, proprietorship, joint venture,
partnership, trust, business trust, syndicate, association, joint stock
company, corporation, limited liability company, government, agency
of any government, or any other organization.”5 Under the statute, a
corporate entity is considered to be a “person” and thus has all the
rights, responsibilities, and remedies of a person under the law, except
as otherwise prohibited by the legislature or judiciary.6 One such limitation is the ability for the corporation to be represented in litigation
by an unlicensed attorney, whether an agent, shareholder, officer, director, or employee of the corporation. That a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney in litigation is a common law rule that
dates all the way back to 1824, when the United States Supreme Court
stated in the case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States7 that “[a]
corporation . . . can appear only by attorney.”8 This requirement is unlike the rights of a “natural person,” who “may represent himself and
present his own case to the court although he is not a licensed attorney.”9 While a corporation is a “person,” it is not a “natural person.”10
In California, that a corporation must be represented by counsel
in civil actions has been established through case law. The California
Supreme Court discusses this rule in great detail in the case of Merco
Construction Engineers v. Municipal Court.11 There, the petitioner,
Merco Construction Engineers, Inc., appealed from a judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate directing the respondent, Long
Beach Municipal Court, to allow Merco to appear in a civil action
through a corporate officer who was not an attorney.12 In affirming the
trial court’s judgment, the California Supreme Court gave various justifications for why a corporation cannot be represented by a non-attorney in litigation, including maintaining the distinction between a corporation and its shareholders, preventing negative effects on the legal
profession, and creating an unfair advantage for corporations in the
courtroom.13
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 28043 (West 2006).
Id.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
Id. at 830.
Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P.2d 867, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
Id.
581 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 640–41.
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California’s rule for corporations is not unique to the state, but
rather appears to be the rule throughout the nation, both statewide and
federally, for civil cases.14 Unforgivingly, even “financial hardship is
no excuse for permitting a nonlawyer to represent a corporation.”15
Indeed, it has been routinely held, both at the state and federal level,
that the rule does not “violate constitutional rights as a denial of equal
protection or a denial of due process.”16 “In other words, there is nothing unfair, illegal, or unconstitutional in requiring corporations to be
represented by licensed attorneys in court proceedings.”17 While
[a] corporation may try to avoid the rule requiring appearance by an attorney by assigning the claim that is the basis of
the complaint to an individual, usually the sole shareholder
of the corporation[,] . . . this practice has been rejected by
courts as a device that is no more than a procedural subterfuge to avoid court rules prohibiting corporations from appearing without legal representation.18
This Article explores California’s well-established rule that a corporation must be represented by an attorney in litigation. Part II lays
out the federal counterparts for the rule in the California district courts
and Ninth Circuit, and prohibitions on circumventing the rule through
assignment of corporate rights to a natural person. Part III describes
the judiciary’s rationales for the rule, including preventing the unauthorized practice of law by corporate representatives, preserving the
integrity of the legal profession, preserving efficiency in the administration of justice, and maintaining the distinction between the entity
and its shareholders, directors, and officers.19 Part IV details exceptions to the rule for small claims cases, administrative proceedings, de
novo appeals from administrative decisions, and judgment debtors examinations. Part V explores the effect of a non-attorney filing paperwork on behalf of the corporation, and Part VI explores an attorney’s
ability to withdraw in the midst of proceedings without offending the
rule. Part VII advocates for an additional exception to the rule for corporations that are owned and operated by a single individual, i.e., one
14. 9A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 4463 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2008). “Corporation to make appearance through attorney.” Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. CLD Constr., Inc. v. City of San Ramon, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 557–58 (Ct. App. 2004).
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individual serves as the sole shareholder, director, and officer of the
corporation, such as Jane Bennet’s corporation.
Ultimately, in an effort to prevent undue prejudice to a natural
person who sets up an entity, which in turn shields him or her from
personal liability, this Article proposes to limit the well-established
rule for single-individual for-profit corporations. The owners of these
types of corporations should have the ability to represent the corporation in litigation, just as natural persons have the right to appear in
propria persona. While smaller corporations, such as those comprising
two or three shareholders who run the business, may also benefit from
limiting the well-established rule, this Article does not advocate for an
additional exception in those cases because the corporate ownership
and structure is not analogous to a single, natural person, unlike a corporation that is owned and operated by a single shareholder. Because
Jane’s corporation need act in the best interest of Jane and only Jane,
it follows that Jane should have the right to represent the corporation
in litigation, just as she would have the right to represent herself had
she operated the business as a sole proprietorship.
II. SIMILAR RULES IN CALIFORNIA DISTRICT COURTS AND THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
The well-established rule that a corporation must be represented
by a licensed attorney applies not only to cases filed in California state
courts, but also to cases filed in federal courts in the State of California. While the state’s rule appears in case law, the United States District Courts have established the requirement via their Local Rules per
the authority granted to them by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 83, which allows a majority of the district judges to adopt and
amend rules that are consistent with the federal statutes and rules.20
Moreover, consistent with California, the Ninth Circuit’s rule appears
in case law.
20. Local Rule 3-9(b) for the Northern District of California states, “A corporation, unincorporated association, partnership or other such entity may appear only through a member of the bar
of this Court.” N.D. Cal. R. 3-9(b). Local Rule 183 of the Eastern District states, “A corporation or
other entity may appear only by an attorney.” E.D. Cal. R. 183(a). Local Rule 83-2.2.2 of the Central District states, “No organization or entity of any other kind (including corporations, limited
liability corporations, partnerships, limited liability partnerships, unincorporated associations,
trusts) may appear in any action or proceeding unless represented by an attorney permitted to practice before this Court . . . .” C.D. Cal. R. 83-2.2.2. Local Rule 83.3(j) of the Southern District states,
“All other parties, including corporations, partnerships and other legal entities, may appear in court
only through an attorney permitted to practice . . . .” S.D. Cal. R. 83.3(j).
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In the Ninth Circuit case Highlander, Inc. v. Rothman (In re Highley),21 the appellant sought to have an involuntary adjudication of
bankruptcy of a corporation set aside on grounds that the bankruptcy
court lacked jurisdiction over the proceedings.22 The corporation and
attorneys filed an application to appoint the attorneys as counsel for
the corporation, but this was subsequently denied due to conflict of
interest.23 The corporation and attorneys then tried to attack the order
denying the application, but failed to do so in a timely manner.24
Therefore, that order became final and could not be challenged.25 The
Ninth Circuit indicated that because the law firm did not represent the
corporation or otherwise have an independent interest in the bankruptcy proceedings that would render it an “aggrieved person” with
standing, the corporation was not properly before the court because it
was not being represented by counsel.26 The Ninth Circuit dismissed
the appeals, affirming the adjudication of the bankruptcy.27 In reaching its decision that “[a] corporation can appear in a court proceeding
only through an attorney at law,” the Ninth Circuit cited to multiple
cases for the rule, all of which were from different circuits.28 Specifically, the rule was previously found in the Second, Third, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits, dating back to 1966.29
Moreover, while both the district courts and Ninth Circuits have
made it clear that only “individuals” or “natural persons” may represent themselves pro se,30 a corporation has no right to assign its claims
to an individual to circumvent the rule.31 In Global eBusiness Services,
Inc. v. Interactive Brokers LLC,32 Syed Nazim Ali appealed pro se
“from the district court’s judgment denying a petition to vacate an
21. 459 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1972).
22. Id. at 554–55.
23. Id. at 555.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 555–56.
27. Id. at 556.
28. Id. at 555.
29. Id. (first citing United States v. 9.19 Acres of Land, 416 F.2d 1244, 1245 (6th Cir. 1969);
then citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Cont’l Rec. Co., 386 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1967); then
citing Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1966); and then citing DeVilliers v.
Atlas Corp., 360 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir. 1966)).
30. N.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3-9(b); E.D. Cal. R. 183(s); C.D. Cal. R. 83-2.2.2.; S.D. Cal. Civ. R.
83.3(j).
31. See Global eBusiness Servs., Inc. v. Interactive Brokers LLC, 741 F. App’x 450, 451 (9th
Cir. 2018).
32. Id.
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arbitration award entered against Global eBusiness Services, Inc., and
granting Interactive Brokers LLC’s motion to confirm the award.”33
After warning new counsel for Global eBusiness Services, also an appellant, to file a notice of appearance within fourteen days, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute as to Global
eBusiness Services because no new counsel had filed a notice of appearance.34 The Ninth Circuit had warned in its order that failure to
comply would result in the automatic dismissal of the appeal by the
Clerk of the Court.35 After dismissing the appeal, the court did not
consider the individual appellant Ali’s contentions on behalf of Global
eBusiness Services, because Ali, who was appearing pro se, could not
represent a corporation.36
III. THE JUDICIARY’S AUTHORITY OVER AND RATIONALE BEHIND THE
CALIFORNIA RULE
In Merco Construction Engineers v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court of California made it abundantly clear that the determination as to who is qualified to practice law is an inherent power of
the judiciary, whose rules and requirements as to this matter take precedence over any contradicting statute.37 There, the court struck down
section 90 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provided
in relevant part: “Where a corporation is a party in the municipal court
it may appear through a director, an officer, or an employee, whether
or not such person is an attorney at law.”38 Merco had relied on this
statute in arguing that it should be allowed to appear in the action via
a corporate officer who was not an attorney.39 The California Supreme
Court held that the trial court did not err in denying Merco’s petition
for writ of mandate because section 90 violated the California Constitution’s separation of powers clause and therefore was of no force and
effect.40 The court reasoned that the separation of powers clause of the
California Constitution precluded the legislature from “designating
those persons who are authorized to practice law.”41 The court stated,
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 450.
Id. at 450–51.
Id. at 451.
Id. (citing C.E. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Merco Constr. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Mun. Ct., 581 P.2d 636, 637–38 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 637 n.2.
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id.
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“[t]he exclusive right to determine who is qualified to practice law is
claimed to be an inherent power of the judiciary.”42 While the legislature may regulate admission to the bar, the courts have authority to
require more than legislative regulations demand.43 Furthermore, such
legislative regulations “are valid only to the extent they do not conflict
with rules for admission adopted or approved by the judiciary.”44
The court rejected Merco’s argument that the legislature, by enacting section 90, expanded the legal “personhood” of a corporation
to include the right to appear in court in propria persona.45 Citing to
various cases, the court stated that, prior to enactment of section 90, it
was well established that a corporation could not appear in court in
propria persona.46 The basis for this rule was that a “corporation is a
distinct legal entity separate from its stockholders and from its officers.”47 “If [the court] were to hold that a corporation represents itself
when appearing through a ‘director, an officer, or an employee’ (Code
Civ. Proc., § 90), then it would necessarily follow that the corporate
‘self’ is comprised of directors, officers, or employees . . . .”48 This
was “contrary to the authorities” noted by the court.49
Indeed, this distinction between a corporation and its shareholders, directors, and officers was also mentioned by the First Circuit in
In re Victor Publishers, Inc.50 There, the appellant, Pace, a non-lawyer, moved to appear on behalf of Victor Publishers, Inc., a debtor in
Chapter XI proceedings in bankruptcy court.51 The bankruptcy judge
denied the motion on the grounds that Pace was a non-lawyer, who
therefore could not represent the corporation.52 Pace appealed and the
district court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.53 In affirming the dismissal, the First Circuit stated that the rule is rooted in both
42. Id. at 637–38.
43. Id. at 638.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 639.
46. Id. at 638–39 (first citing Vann v. Shilleh, 126 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406 (Ct. App. 1975); then
citing Roddis v. Strong, 58 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1967); then citing Himmel v. City Council,
336 P.2d 996 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); and then citing Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P.2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App.
1948)).
47. Id. at 639 (quoting Maxwell Cafe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 298 P.2d
64, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 545 F.2d 285 (1st Cir. 1976).
51. Id. at 286.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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common law and the practical consideration that “[s]ince a corporation can appear only through its agents, they must be acceptable to the
court.”54 The First Circuit noted that “attorneys at law, who have been
admitted to practice, are officers of the court and subject to its control.”55
Accordingly, while the Merco court noted the exception that corporations are permitted to be represented by non-attorneys in small
claims court,56 as discussed in detail below, it declined to expand such
permission to other settings in the interest of the integrity of the legal
profession and officers of the court.57 The court reasoned that to expand the rule would have negative effects on the legal profession by
allowing practice by disbarred attorneys, disincentivizing formal education, licensing, and observation of the professional rules of conduct,
and creating an unfair advantage for corporations in the courtroom.58
Section 90 did “not . . . serve the general welfare in that it would authorize the appearance, in behalf of a corporation, of almost any person selected by a corporation regardless of the length of his association
or employment, his position with the corporation, or his training, character and background.”59 Under section 90, the representative “could
be a paraprofessional who, while having failed to pass a bar examination, is nevertheless not precluded from practicing law so long as he
confines his client/employer to corporations and his practice to justice
and municipal courts.”60 The court did not agree to essentially allow
“[s]uch persons [to] hire themselves out on a part time basis to a number of corporations, creating a cadre of unprofessional practitioners.”61
Indeed, “[u]nlike members of the State Bar, they would not be subject
to professional rules of conduct nor be required to adhere to ethical
standards established by any governmental or professional agency.”62
Allowing corporations to be “represented by persons not subject to
ethical restraints” would afford them “an opportunity to take unfair
advantage in particular situations—as in debt collections on claims of
54. Id. (alteration in original).
55. Id.
56. Merco Constr. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Mun. Ct., 581 P.2d 636, 640 (Cal. 1978) (citing Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Small Claims Ct., 173 P.2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 640–41.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 641.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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little or no merit against persons of low income who are inclined to
default even against such unmeritorious claims.”63
IV. CURRENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE CALIFORNIA RULE
California’s well-established rule for corporations is already subject to some exceptions. The current exceptions relate to small claims
cases (for which an attorney actually cannot appear on behalf of a corporation), administrative proceedings, de novo appeals from administrative decisions, and judgment debtor examinations.
A. The Small Claims Exception
A small claims action in California is one where the amount of
the demand does not exceed $10,000, if the claim is brought by a natural person, and $5,000, if the claim is brought by an entity.64 Section
116.530 of the Code of Civil Procedure, formerly codified as Code of
Civil Procedure section 117(g), states that “no attorney may take part
in the conduct or defense of a small claims action,” except if the attorney is appearing to maintain or defend an action:
(1) By or against himself or herself;
(2) By or against a partnership in which he or she is a general
partner and in which all the partners are attorneys; [or]
(3) By or against a professional corporation of which he or
she is an officer or director and of which all other officers
and directors are attorneys.65
Accordingly, section 116.540(a) states that “no individual other than
the plaintiff and the defendant may take part in the conduct or defense
of a small claims action.”66 For a corporation, it “may appear and participate in a small claims action only through a regular employee, or a
duly appointed or elected officer or director, who is employed, appointed, or elected for purposes other than solely representing the corporation in small claims court.”67
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Small Claims Court,68
the court analyzed the statute prohibiting an attorney from appearing
for a corporation in small claims court. There,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 116.220–.221 (West 2006 & Supp. 2021).
Id. § 116.530.
Id. § 116.540(a).
Id. § 116.540(b).
173 P.2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946).
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Prudential Insurance Company of America appeal[ed] from
a judgment of the Superior Court denying to appellant a writ
of prohibition by which it sought to restrain the Small Claims
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from proceeding with an action pending before it in which appellant was
the defendant.69
The appellant was a New Jersey corporation conducting insurance
business in California. The company had offices throughout California
and regularly retained counsel in various cities in the state.70 “In May
of 1945 an action was commenced in the [s]mall [c]laims [c]ourt by a
holder of a Prudential life policy with disability benefits naming appellant as defendant.”71 By order that was served on the company’s
manager in San Francisco and agent for service of process in the state,
“appellant was directed by the court to appear and answer on a specified date.”72 The court explained that:
Before the date fixed in the order appellant specially appeared in the [s]mall [c]laims [c]ourt and moved to quash the
service of summons, urging . . . that that court had no jurisdiction over appellant. The motion was denied, whereupon
appellant sought a writ of prohibition in the [s]uperior
[c]ourt. An alternative writ was issued and a full hearing had.
The [s]uperior [c]ourt denied the application and appellant . . . appealed.73
In the petition, the company asserted that its legal counsel was its
only agent or representative in California with knowledge of all of the
facts of the case or authority to appear on behalf of the company.74
The trial court, however, found that the attorney’s “only knowledge of
the case [came] from having possession of the files of the company
relating to the case, that he ha[d] no other knowledge of the facts, and
that these files were forwarded to him by the eastern counsel of the
company.”75 The petition alleged that, because the small claims court
would not permit the attorney to appear and defend the action, the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court would deprive the company of its constitutional rights.76 The
court noted that “[t]he appeal present[ed] several interesting and difficult questions of first impression involving the constitutionality and
interpretation of the statutes creating the [s]mall [c]laims [c]ourt, particularly as those statutes apply to corporations.”77
“The first question presented [was] whether the prohibition
against the appearance of lawyers renders § 117g unconstitutional.”78
Appellant “urged that depriving a litigant of the right of counsel is a
violation of due process.”79 The court noted, “[t]here can be little
doubt but that in both civil and criminal cases the right to a hearing
includes the right to appear by counsel, and that the arbitrary refusal
of such right constitutes a deprivation of due process.”80 “But that does
not mean that the legislature cannot create a Small Claims Court where
informal hearings may be held without the assistance of counsel, as
long as the right to appear by counsel is guaranteed in a real sense
somewhere in the proceeding.”81 The court reasoned that, obviously,
“the plaintiff cannot object, although he has no right of appeal, because
he has elected to commence the action in the [s]mall [c]laims
[c]ourt.”82 If the plaintiff desires to have an attorney, then the plaintiff
“can sue, even on these small claims, in the [j]ustices or [m]unicipal
[c]ourts.”83 “The defendant has no legal cause for complaint because
if he is dissatisfied with the judgment of the [s]mall [c]laims [c]ourt
he has a right of appeal to the [s]uperior [c]ourt where he is entitled to
a trial de novo.”84 “In that court he and the plaintiff can, of course,
appear by counsel.”85 The court concluded that the process “satisfies
the due process requirement.”86
The court went on to analogize the deprivation of an attorney in
small claims court to the deprivation of a jury trial in small claims
court or conciliation court, which had been upheld by the U.S.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (first citing Roberts v. Anderson, 66 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1933); then citing Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); then citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); and
then citing Steen v. Bd. of Civ. Serv. Comm’rs, 160 P.2d 816, 822 (Cal. 1945)).
81. Id. at 40.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Supreme Court in the leading case of Capital Traction Co. v. Hof.87 In
that case,
[i]t was there held that the right to a common-law jury trial
as guaranteed by the seventh amendment to the United States
Constitution was not violated by a statutory provision allowing the primary trial of civil cases of moderate amount by a
justice of the peace with or without a non-common-law jury,
where the statute also allowed the parties the right to appeal
to a court of record where a common-law jury could be had.88
The court further noted that the same result was reached by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co. v.
Young,89 which upheld “the constitutionality of the statute of that state
creating the conciliation and small debtor’s court, in which juries were
barred.”90 “The constitutional guaranty is satisfied if a party is afforded a jury trial on appeal though not in the tribunal of primary jurisdiction.”91 In analogizing the cases, the court noted that “[c]ertainly
the constitutional guaranty of a jury trial is as important as the constitutional right to appear and prosecute or defend by counsel.”92 Therefore, “[i]f the one constitutional right is not violated as long as a jury
trial may be had upon appeal, the right to an appeal where a trial de
novo with counsel may be had satisfies the other constitutional requirement.”93
The next question in the case was “whether the statutes applicable
to such small claims courts apply to corporations, i.e., may they sue or
be sued in such courts?”94 The court examined whether a corporation
was a “person” within the meaning of section 117(g), which stated that
“‘[n]o attorney at law or other person than the plaintiff and defendant’
shall take any part in the prosecution or defense of such litigation.”95
While the court did acknowledge that the word “person” includes a
corporation under California Code of Civil Procedure section 17, it
focused on the appellant’s argument that a “corporation is an artificial
entity separate and distinct from its officers or agents, and since
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

174 U.S. 1 (1899); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 173 P.2d at 40.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 173 P.2d at 40.
185 N.W. 934 (Minn. 1921).
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 173 P.2d at 40.
Id. (quoting Flour City, 185 N.W. at 936).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 117(g) (repealed 1990).
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[section] 117g prohibits any ‘other person’ than the plaintiff or defendant from appearing, if a corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the section it is in fact prohibited from appearing at all.”96 “In
other words, it [wa]s argued that the officers, agents, representatives
and employees of a corporation are ‘other’ persons within the meaning
of section 117g.”97 The court reasoned that “[i]f this contention is
sound the section would deprive corporations of the opportunity to appear and defend such actions, since the artificial entity cannot itself
speak, and this would deprive corporations of due process.”98
In denying this contention, the court stated that “[t]he legislature
could not have intended such a strict and unreasonable construction of
the words ‘other person’ in the section.”99 The court explained that
this is made apparent by various constitutional and statutory provisions.100 It noted that:
Article XII, [section] 4 of the Constitution, provides, in part,
that “all corporations shall have the right to sue and shall be
subject to be sued, in all [c]ourts, in like cases as natural persons.” Section 341(1) of the Civil Code provides that every
corporation has power “to sue and be sued in any court.” In
6A [California Jurisprudence], [page] 1378, [section] 805,
the problem, amply supported by case authority, is discussed
as follows: “The Code of Civil Procedure, § 17, declares that
the word ‘person’ includes a corporation as well as a natural
person. By that code the law of procedure is general and not
divisible into special schemes of procedure, one where a corporation is a party and another where natural persons are parties.” In the same volume at [page] 1380, [section] 806, it is
stated: “Jurisdiction, which in its broad sense is the power to
hear and determine, and in its applied sense is the power to
hear and determine the particular case as regards the parties
therein, exists over actions by or against corporations in the
same cases, and to the same extent, and is to be acquired in
the same ways, as over actions between natural persons. The
jurisdiction of courts is not made to depend upon the

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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incorporate character of the parties and the venue is not jurisdictional, if no objection be made that it is improper.”101
The court concluded, therefore, that:
[W]hen [section] 117g provide[d] that only the plaintiff and
defendant may prosecute or defend such actions, and prohibit[ed] any “other person” from so appearing, it did not intend to exclude, and by its language it [did] not exclude, a
proper representative of the corporation from appearing or
defending such actions. The contended for interpretation
would disregard the provisions of the Constitution and the
Civil Code above quoted. Since corporations can only appear
through some natural person it is obvious that the proper natural person may appear to prosecute or defend such claims,
and that such a proper person is not an “other person” excluded by [section] 117g.102
In consolidating this conclusion with California’s well-established rule that a corporation must appear via counsel in litigation, the
court noted that this rule involved “cases [that] dealt with courts of
record and dealt with general common-law principles.”103 In other
words, “[t]hey all resolve around the general rule that a corporation in
the absence of statutory authority, even in its own behalf, cannot practice law.”104 Accordingly, none of the cases “dealt with a statutory situation” as involved in the small claims context.105 In such context, the
court indicated that:
[Section] 117g . . . expressly confers on corporations, as well
as on other persons, the right to prosecute or defend such actions. At the same time it denies to corporations as well as to
other litigants the right to appear in such actions by attorneys.
Since a corporation can only speak through a natural person,
it is apparent, therefore, that [section] 117g must be interpreted as conferring on corporations the right to appear
through some representative other than an attorney.106

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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That meant that in the context of small claims cases, “there is express
statutory authorization for a corporation to appear in propria persona
through some proper representative other than an attorney.”107
After resolving the two issues, the court went on to determine
“who is a proper representative that may lawfully appear in such
cases.”108 According to the court:
Obviously, the members of the board of directors and other
officers should be permitted to so appear, and this is so
whether or not they are attorneys. This follows because in
such cases they are not appearing as an attorney but in their
capacity as an officer, and represent the corporation in the
same sense as an individual attorney may appear to defend or
prosecute such actions as a plaintiff or defendant in such
courts. In the present case the foreign corporation did not
have an officer or member of its board in California. It did
have, however, a manager of its life business, who was also
its statutory agent for service of all legal process, in this
state.109
The court reasoned that the manager “quite clearly, can appear on behalf of the corporation to defend the action.”110 But this did not answer
the question as to “who else should be permitted to appear on behalf
of the corporation,” which the court noted “could well be a subject for
legislative action.”111 However,
[i]n the absence of such action it would appear just and
proper that any regular employee, not directly employed as a
lawyer, but whose duties give him peculiar knowledge of the
facts of such cases, could appear to represent the corporation,
and this is so whether or not he is an attorney.112
The court also answered the question of whether any “such a limitation on the corporate right to appear is unfair in that a large part of
the time of busy and highly paid executives may be consumed in defending small claims asserted against their companies.”113 In rejecting
this position, the court reasoned that “[t]he same argument could be
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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made against forcing the individual to appear personally and thus consuming a portion of his valuable time that he might think could be
more profitably spent elsewhere.”114 The court concluded that “the
legislature of this state, drawing on the experience of many European
countries and of many American states, has determined that the social
benefits to the poor litigant far outweigh the slight inconveniences to
the wealthy one.”115 The Court states that “[t]he determination of such
a problem is for the legislature, and as long as that body stays within
constitutional limitations, the courts cannot and should not interfere.”116
B. The Administrative Proceedings Exception
An administrative proceeding is a non-judicial mechanism that is
adjudicatory in nature in order to determine fault or wrongdoing.117 In
Caressa Camille, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Board,118 petitioner “Caressa Camille, Inc. . . . petitioned for judicial
review of an order of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Board . . . affirming a decision of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control . . . revoking Caressa’s liquor license for a bar it owns
known as Joey’s.”119 At the department’s administrative hearing,
where it revoked the corporation’s license, the corporation was represented by its president, not by counsel.120 The corporation sought an
annulment of the order and decision on grounds that “the department
lacked jurisdiction to proceed against Caressa’s license because Caressa was not represented by counsel during the hearing.”121 The court
held that “the general common law rule in this state requiring corporations to be represented by counsel in proceedings before courts of
record other than small claims courts does not extend to proceedings
before administrative agencies and tribunals.”122
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that an administrative
hearing does not take place in a “court of record” and that the general

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 43.
48 C.F.R. § 9.101 (2020).
121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 760.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 760.
Id.
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rule only applied to “courts of records.”123 The Court referred to Article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution, which states, “[t]he
judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of
appeal, superior courts, and municipal courts, all of which are courts
of record.”124 While the California Constitution does confer limited
judicial power to the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to
revoke or suspend licenses for good cause, an administrative tribunal
nevertheless is not defined as a “court of record.”125 Unlike administrative tribunals, “courts of record are entitled to expect to be aided in
resolution of contested issues by presentation of causes through qualified professionals rather than a lay person [sic].”126 For administrative
proceedings, “those problems which are likely to arise when a lay[person] serves as the legal representative for a corporation in a proceeding
in a court of record are greatly minimized in the more informal setting
of a proceeding in a court which is not of record.”127 The court further
noted that “a decision rendered by an administrative body following a
hearing at which a corporation was not represented by counsel would
be voidable at the option of the opposing party, rather than void for
lack of jurisdiction.”128
C. The Notice of Appeal from Administrative Ruling Exception
Another exception to the general rule is that a nonlawyer agent of
a corporation can file a notice of appeal from an administrative ruling
to secure a de novo hearing in the trial court that is statutorily permitted.129 In Rogers v. Sonoma County Municipal Court,130 a corporation
filed a notice of appeal, through its president who was not an attorney,
from an award of back wages by the Labor Commissioner pursuant to
section 98.2 of the California Labor Code.131 Thereafter, the “[p]etitioner, represented by the[L]abor [C]ommissioner, filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was not
signed by a licensed attorney.”132 The municipal court denied the
123. Id. at 765.
124. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1).
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Merco Constr. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Mun. Ct., 581 P.2d 636, 732 (Cal. 1978)).
127. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Grp., Inc., 485 S.E.2d 22, 25
(Ga. 1997)).
128. Id. (citing Jardine Ests., Inc. v. Koppel, 133 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1957)).
129. Rogers v. Sonoma Cnty. Mun. Ct., 243 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531–32 (Ct. App. 1988).
130. 243 Cal. Rptr. 530.
131. Id. at 530–31.
132. Id. at 531.
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motion, and the employee filed a petition for a writ of mandate with
the superior court directing the municipal court to dismiss the appeal,
but the superior court denied the petition.133 The court of appeal
treated the employee’s appeal from the superior court’s order denying
such petition as a petition to the court of appeal for an extraordinary
writ, but denied the writ.134 The court held that the notice of appeal
was filed in a valid manner, as an appeal from a decision of the Labor
Commissioner differs from a conventional appeal in that it calls for a
hearing de novo, and that a nonlawyer agent of a corporation may file
a notice of appeal from an administrative ruling to secure a de novo
hearing.135 “Although the notice of appeal may, in a general sense, be
thought of as an initial trial pleading,” the court held that “any similarity with a usual civil complaint ends there,” as its sole purpose is to
give notice of the de novo hearing request.136
The petitioner argued that “since the notice of appeal triggers a
de novo review in the municipal court, it operates as an initial pleading, and, as such, it can only be signed by an attorney.”137 The court,
however, indicated that
[a]lthough the notice of appeal may, in a general sense, be
thought of as an initial trial pleading, any similarity with a
usual civil complaint ends there. The notice of appeal is a
form document which contains only the names of the parties
and the dates of the administrative action. Its sole purpose is
to give notice to the losing party of the de novo hearing request.138
The court concluded that the notice of appeal “requires no legal training or acumen to prepare and file” and “imparts no information to the
opposing side which will affect the trial of the issues.”139 Indeed,
“[t]he legal position of the responding party cannot be prejudiced by
anything contained in that document.”140 “Generally, that party is not
required to make any kind of a response in order to protect its rights,
nor is the notice of appeal subject to a demurrer or motion to strike.”141
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 531, 533.
Id. at 531–32.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Therefore, “[t]he corporate officer who signs the notice of appeal is
not engaging in the practice of law.”142
Accordingly, the court concluded that “[n]one of the harmful consequences of unlicensed law practice are evident” in the context of an
appeal from an administrative ruling.143 “[T]he client corporation is
not prejudiced by the lack of legal education or experience of the officer, as it would be if he were permitted to appear in court on the
corporation’s behalf.”144 There is also “no confusion aris[ing] because
of unintelligible, untimely or inappropriate documents drawn by the
layman; which is often a problem even when a natural person appears
in propria persona.”145
Contrarily, in Paradise v. Nowlin,146 the California Court of Appeal deemed the defendant-appellant’s notice of appeal “void by reason of the corporation’s lack of power to represent itself in an action
in court.”147 There, the plaintiffs-respondents “moved to dismiss the
appeal of defendant-appellant Federated Income Properties, Inc., a
corporation, on the ground that appellant failed to pay the filing fee
within 20 days after being notified by the clerk of the Supreme Court
to pay the same.”148 According to the court, there was a “more important reason for the dismissal of the appeal,” that is, “that the defendant corporation filed the notice of appeal in the superior court and
its opposition to the dismissal in th[e] [appellate] court in propria persona.”149 Although the corporation was represented by an attorney at
the trial, the attorney’s “services apparently terminated with the entry
of judgment in favor of plaintiffs.”150
In reaching its conclusion and dismissing the appeal, the court
cited in part to the case of Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of Philadelphia.151 While Mullin-Johnson did not involve a notice of appeal, its reasoning and citation in the Paradise case
suggests that the filing of a notice of appeal qualifies as the act of
“managing a case,” which can only be performed by a member of the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
195 P.2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id.
Id.
9 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1934).
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state bar.152 In Mullin-Johnson, the District Court for the Northern
District of California noted that “[i]t is settled in California that there
are certain professional occupations which a corporation is functionally incapable of engaging in, such as the practice of the law.”153
Therefore, the “[p]laintiff corporation [wa]s not, and could not be, a
member of the bar of California.”154 The court noted, “[o]bviously
plaintiff corporation could not plead and manage its case personally.”155
D. The Judgment Debtor Examination Exception
Sections 708.110 et seq. of the California Code of Civil Procedure
governs the rules for judgment debtor examinations. This is a formal
court proceeding whereby a creditor obtains information for purposes
of collecting on a judgment about a judgment debtor’s sources of income and assets, such as personal property, real property, bank accounts, stocks, and investments. Section 708.150(d) states that “[a]
corporation, partnership, association, trust, limited liability company,
or other organization, whether or not a party, may appear at an examination through any authorized officer, director, or employee, whether
or not the person is an attorney.”156
In analyzing this statute, in its order that a third-party limited liability company appear for the examination, in its order that a thirdparty limited liability company appear for the examination, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California noted that
the third party was “required to designate and produce a representative
who is knowledgeable about Debtors’ property for examination.”157
Similarly, in Gutierrez v. Vantia Properties, LLC,158 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California noted that because
the judgment creditor did not specify an individual to appear in the
examination proceeding in their application, the judgment debtor LLC
was required to “designate to appear and be examined one or more
152. Paradise, 195 P.2d at 868; see also Mullin-Johnson, 9 F. Supp. at 175 (adjudicating
whether a corporation may file a previously-dismissed state court complaint in federal court and
holding it could not because a corporation cannot plead and manage its own case personally or
through an agent who is not licensed to practice law).
153. Mullin-Johnson, 9 F. Supp. at 175.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.150(d) (West 2009 & Supp. 2021).
157. Gavrieli Brands LLC v. Soto Massini (USA) Corp., No. 20-MC-01221, 2020 WL
7226169, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2020).
158. No. 13-cv-00642, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18164 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015).
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officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons who [were] familiar with its property and debts.”159
V. EFFECTS OF NON-ATTORNEY FILINGS
The case of Paradise v. Nowlin, whereby the court dismissed the
appeal when the corporate appellant’s notice of appeal was filed in
propria persona, was decided when “there was no uniform rule regarding the consequence of a corporation’s failure to be represented by an
attorney.”160 Since Paradise, there has since been a trend toward lenience.161 In CLD Construction v. City of San Ramon,162 decided in
2004, the California Court of Appeal noted that “[i]n federal courts
there has been a consistent pattern during the last 40 years to dismiss
a corporation that initially appears via a nonattorney officer or shareholder only after the corporation has been given a reasonable time to
secure counsel.”163 For example, in Gamet v. Blanchard,164 after “a
nonlawyer shareholder/director noticed an appeal on behalf of the corporation[,] . . . [w]ithout any mention of Paradise, the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three, notified the corporation that its
appeal would be dismissed unless it retained counsel, which it did.”165
Accordingly, since Paradise, where a non-attorney files pleadings on behalf of a corporation, the court should “liberally” grant leave
to amend the pleadings where a “defect raised by a motion to strike or
by a demurrer is reasonably capable of cure.”166 In CLD Construction
v. City of San Ramon, the plaintiff CLD Construction, Inc. (“CLD”)
filed a complaint against the defendant for breach of contract, appearing “pro per,” which was signed by the president of CLD, a non-lawyer.167 Nearly two months after the original filing, CLD filed a substitution of attorney that was executed by its president and which
substituted a lawyer as its attorney of record.168 The defendant “moved
to strike CLD’s complaint in its entirety on the grounds a corporation
159. Order for Appearance and Examination of Judgment Debtor Vantia Properties at 3,
Gutierrez v. Vantia Props, No. 13-cv-00642 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015), ECF No. 50 (quoting CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.150(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2021)).
160. CLD Constr., Inc. v. City of San Ramon, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 559 (Ct. App. 2004).
161. Id.
162. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555.
163. Id. at 559.
164. 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 (Ct. App. 2001).
165. CLD Constr., Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
166. Id. at 558.
167. Id. at 556–57.
168. Id. at 557.

(6) 55.2_HASHEMI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

396

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

5/5/22 2:04 PM

[Vol. 55:373

cannot file a pleading in propria persona.”169 Alternatively, the defendant “demurred on the grounds the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because a complaint filed in propria persona on behalf of a
corporation is void, and no valid complaint was filed within the requisite six months.”170 “The trial court granted the motion to strike without leave to amend” on the basis that “CLD’s complaint was filed by
a corporation without legal representation” and therefore “was a ‘nullity.’”171 “The trial court reasoned that because the substitution of attorney . . . occurred after the statute of limitations for filing the complaint had run, the court lacked ‘original jurisdiction.’ It then
dismissed the action with prejudice, and entered judgment and
awarded costs to the [defendant].”172
On appeal, the corporation-appellant argued that the trial court
erred in granting the motion to strike without leave to amend.173 In
reversing the trial court’s ruling, the court of appeal referred to the
well-established rule that courts should “liberally” grant leave to
amend pleadings where a “defect raised by a motion to strike or by a
demurrer is reasonably capable of cure.”174 That is because “[p]leading[s] may only be stricken upon terms . . . that are ‘just.’”175 The
court reasoned that if “the defect raised by a motion to strike or by
demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, ‘leave to amend is routinely
and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in
question.’”176 “It is generally an abuse of discretion to deny leave to
amend, because the drastic step of denial of the opportunity to correct
the curable defect effectively terminates the pleader’s action.”177
“[T]he absence of legal representation at the threshold step of a lawsuit—filing the complaint—rarely prejudices the opposing party.”178
“To the extent the opposing party is burdened by having to bring a
motion to strike the complaint of a corporation not represented by
counsel, the court, as a condition for granting leave to amend, may

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 562.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. (quoting Price v. Dames & Moore, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 69 (Ct. App. 2001)).
Id.
Id. at 561.
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order the corporation to pay the opposing party’s expenses for bringing the motion.”179
The court went on to cite to various cases that set forth exceptions
to the rule that a corporation must always be represented by an attorney in California courts.180 This included the small claims exception,
the administrative proceedings exception, and the appeal from an administrative ruling exception.181 Considering the “increasing acceptance of the view that representation of the corporation by an attorney is not an absolute prerequisite to the court’s fundamental power to
hear or determine a case,” the court concluded that “it is more appropriate and just to treat a corporation’s failure to be represented by an
attorney as a defect that may be corrected.”182 The holding aligned
with the policies that “in furtherance of justice, complaints are to be
liberally construed (§ 452) and disputes should be resolved on their
merits.”183 “To deem a pleading void because the corporation on
whose behalf it was filed, although statutorily authorized to be a party,
did not have an attorney sign the pleading, elevates the attorney to a
role akin to that of an indispensable party.”184 Moreover, the court’s
flexibility in no way served to impair “the court’s ability to assure that
trained legal professionals participate[d] in the presentation of the corporation’s case . . . [and] the court retain[ed] authority to dismiss an
action if an unrepresented corporation d[id] not obtain counsel within
reasonable time.”185
VI. EFFECTS OF ATTORNEY WITHDRAWALS
Counsel for a corporation may seek to withdraw from representation during the litigation “without offending the rule against corporate
self-representation.”186 Indeed, “[t]he ban on corporate self-representation does not prevent a court from granting a motion to withdraw as
attorney of record, even if it leaves the corporation without representation.”187 In the case of uncooperative corporate clients, granting a
motion to withdraw “put[s] extreme pressure on [the corporation] to
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 560–61 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Thomas G. Ferruzzo, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 163 Cal. Rptr. 573, 575 (Ct. App. 1980).
Gamet v. Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 444 n.5 (Ct. App. 2001).
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obtain new counsel of record for should it fail to do so it risks forfeiture of its rights through nonrepresentation.”188
This forfeiture, however, may only take place after adequate notice of such from the trial court to the corporation.189 In Van Gundy v.
Camelot Resorts, Inc.,190 the court of appeal reasoned that “[w]hen a
corporation seeks to appear without the benefit of counsel . . . it is the
duty of the trial court to advise the representative of the corporation of
the necessity to be represented by a licensed lawyer.”191 If, after advising the corporate representative of such, no licensed attorney appears on behalf of the corporation the court has authority to “(1) hear
a motion for continuance; or (2) enter the corporation’s default for
nonappearance at trial.”192
Accordingly, in reiterating the duty imposed on the trial court by
Van Gundy, almost twenty years later, in Gamet v. Blanchard, the appellate court concluded that, if the record is devoid of proper and adequate notice from the trial court advising the corporation of its need to
retain counsel following a withdrawal, then the trial court is not authorized to, for example, dismiss the corporation’s complaint with
prejudice, strike the corporation’s answer to a cross-complaint, or otherwise enter a default for non-appearance.193 This means that “[a]
judgment entered without notice is void and can be attacked at any
time” by the corporation.194 In other words, a corporation that is not
provided notice by the trial court will be able to set aside such a judgment as void.195
VII. PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE RULE FOR SINGLE-PERSON
CORPORATIONS
For businesses that are owned and operated by a single individual,
the main purpose of setting up an entity, rather than conducting business as a sole proprietor with a fictitious business name, is to gain protection. An entity, such as a corporation or limited liability company,
serves to shield one’s personal income and assets from liability to
business creditors. Unless Jane Bennet signed a personal guarantee in
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Thomas G. Ferruzzo, Inc., 163 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
Van Gundy v. Camelot Resorts, Inc., 199 Cal. Rptr. 771, 772 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1983).
199 Cal. Rptr. 771 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1983).
Id. at 772.
Id.
Gamet v. Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 446 (Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 446–47.
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her contract with the disgruntled vendor or otherwise engaged in conduct that would pierce the corporate veil, her own money and assets
are not subject to any suit or judgment obtained by vendor. In addition,
as far as Jane’s taxes, she has no incentive to set up as a sole proprietor
because she has the option to classify the corporation as an s-corporation to prevent double taxation. For LLCs, these entities are automatically conferred pass-through taxation or can apply to be taxed as an
s-corporation. Therefore, it makes sense for Jane to register her business as a corporation, even if for the sole purpose of protecting herself
from personal liability. However, Jane essentially has to choose between being protected from personal liability and being able to represent her business in litigation. To circumvent this result while continuing to afford Jane the liability protections of the Corporations Code,
there should be an additional exception to the well-established rule for
corporations that are owned and operated by a single individual, that
is, one individual serves as the sole shareholder, director, and officer
of the corporation.
A single-individual corporation is essentially, in practical terms,
the equivalent of a natural person, except the individual also has protection against personal liability. The court reasoned in Merco that expanding the well-established rule would have negative effects on the
legal profession by allowing practice by disbarred attorneys; disincentivizing formal education, licensing, and observation of the professional rules of conduct; and creating an unfair advantage for corporations in the courtroom.196 However, natural persons have the right to
appear in propria persona in litigation, regardless of their lack of legal
training, respect for legal processes, or level of sophistication.197
While there is an “interest in assistance of counsel and maximum procedural efficiency . . . corporations appearing in propria persona will
[not] unduly handicap a court of record.”198 “Individuals have long
been permitted to proceed in propria persona” and “the legal system
has not been left in shambles.”199
Moreover, while the corporate shareholder “could be a
paraprofessional who, while having failed to pass a bar examination,
is nevertheless not precluded from practicing law,”200 this could be the
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Merco Constr. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Mun. Ct., 581 P.2d 636, 640–41 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 638.
Id. at 643 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 641 (majority opinion).
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same result where unlicensed individuals or even disbarred attorneys
are sued personally, for whatever reason, and decide to represent
themselves. Also, while “[u]nlike members of the State Bar, they
would not be subject to professional rules of conduct nor be required
to adhere to ethical standards established by any governmental or professional agency,”201 the same result could flow from an individual’s
representation of himself or herself. Lack of ethical restraints are of no
concern under the current standards, which allow an individual with
deep pockets to bring claims that are “of little or no merit against persons of low income who are inclined to default even against such unmeritorious claims.”202 Therefore, the potential for abuse and unethical conduct should not be a driving factor in preventing an additional
exception to the well-established rule. “In the past, trial courts have
proven quite capable of handling any abuse of in propria persona privileges that may arise in the course of actual litigation,” and thus should
be able to “adequately protect the public in the context of corporate
pro. per. representation.”203
Accordingly, to allow a natural person who is the sole owner and
operator of the corporation to appear on behalf of the corporation in
litigation would have no more of a negative impact on the legal profession than the current status of the law, which allows a natural person to appear in propria persona. As Justice Tobriner noted in his dissent of the majority opinion in Merco, “[t]he abstract distinction
between sole proprietorships and partnerships, which ostensibly constitute ‘natural’ persons, and corporations, which constitute ‘artificial’
persons, has little bearing on the practical effect of nonattorney representation.”204 He further noted, “[b]oth the nonattorney who represents
his own business or his partnership, and the nonattorney who represents his corporate employer perform exactly the same functions both
in and out of court.”205 There has been no showing by the courts or
otherwise “how corporate in propria persona representation [would]
have a more deleterious judicial effect.”206 This is especially true for
a single-individual corporation, which is in effect the same as a natural
person with a sole proprietorship.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 643–44 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id.
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In addition, allowing self-representation for a single-person entity
would not create the threat of authorizing “the appearance, [on] behalf
of a corporation, of almost any person selected by a corporation regardless of the length of his association or employment, his position
with the corporation, or his training, character and background.”207
Rather, the person authorized to appear on behalf of the corporation
would be the only individual who owns an interest in the corporation
and who runs the operations of the corporation, both as a director and
officer. As in the small claims context, a director or officer would appear not as an attorney, but rather in his or her capacity as the corporate
owner and officer.208 In fact, this would help make the litigation more
efficient and straightforward, as the corporate owner would very likely
have “peculiar knowledge of the facts” of the case, “whether or not he
is an attorney,”209 just as a natural person would for his or her own
case.
In this respect, the proposed limitation will be especially effective
in ensuring efficiency, fairness, and even consistency for those cases
where the owner, director, officer, or managing agent of a corporation
can be held liable for the acts of the corporation. For example, Labor
Code section 558.1, subdivision (a), holds responsible for certain labor
code violations not only the employer, but also any “other person acting on behalf of the employer.”210 Subdivision (b) defines the term
“other person acting on behalf of an employer” as “a natural person
who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the employer.”211 This means that an owner may be held responsible for the
acts of the corporation, regardless of whether there is a personal guarantee in the employment contract or the plaintiff can pierce the corporate veil. Therefore, it seems only fair for the owner, who is also the
sole director and officer, to be able to appear on behalf of the corporation to represent the interests of the corporation. By doing so, the
owner also represents his or her own interests since the owner’s responsibility to the plaintiff is inherently tied to the corporation’s liability. This is because, in the context of the cited Labor Code and any
other statute that operates like it, the owner’s individual interest in
striking down liability is reliant on the corporation’s ability to do so.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Contra id. at 640–41 (majority opinion).
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Small Claims Ct., 173 P.2d 38, 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946).
Id.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1(a) (West 2020).
Id. § 558.1(b).
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The current status of the law lacks consistency by requiring a singleperson corporation to retain an attorney to defend the corporation,
while also allowing the owner to represent him or herself as an individual defendant.
This same inconsistency results where, for example, a corporation
defaults on a loan agreement that is backed by a personal guarantee by
the corporate owner. In this instance, the creditor will sue the corporation and the corporate owner personally to recover on the loan.
While the corporate owner is allowed to represent him or herself,
counsel must be retained for the corporation. This is true even though
he or she is the sole owner and operator of the corporation, and also
despite the two sharing a common interest in defending against the
lawsuit. The proposed limitation will resolve this paradoxical result
that arises in the context of individual suit or liability against a shareholder of a single-person corporation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
“Justice should not be a rich man’s luxury.”212 In Jane Bennet’s
situation, the corporation does not have sufficient funds to defend
against the vendor’s lawsuit, but it does have a good faith and meritorious defense. However, the expense incident to the litigation has the
effect of discouraging, and even preventing, redress against an unmeritorious claim.213 Per Justice Tobriner’s dissent in Merco, “corporate
entities, as well as individuals, are often engaged in . . . disputes and
should be entitled as much as individuals to an economical adjudication of their rights.”214 Just as “in propria persona representation by
corporations in small claims” is authorized, there should be some degree by which corporations can appear in propria persona in municipal
courts.215 Specifically, the owner of a single-person for-profit corporation should be allowed to represent the company in litigation. Such
an exception to the well-established rule will promote “efforts to facilitate more procurable, accessible and equal justice.”216 At this time,
Jane is protected from personal liability but prejudiced in litigation.
With the proposed limitation, Jane will not have to choose between
212. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 173 P.2d at 40.
213. See id.
214. Merco Constr. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Mun. Ct., 581 P.2d 636, 643 (Cal. 1978) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 644.
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shielding her own income and assets from liability and being able to
represent her business in a court of record.
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